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Explaining Fraud Deviancy Attenuation in the United Kingdom
Abstract 
Fraud is one of the most costly crimes to society. There have been a number of studies documenting the low priority and resources allocated to fraud, but there has been little attempt to conceptualise the processes which lead to this. This paper develops a concept that is the antithesis to deviancy amplification, deviancy attenuation, to examine why the level of resources and interest in fraud are not commensurate with the size of the problem. The paper also develops two further reverse concepts to further explain attenuation:  de-labelling and immoral phlegmatism.  Empirical evidence is offered in the form of case studies, statistical and survey data to support the arguments presented. The paper also illustrates these arguments through the comparison of the response to benefits fraud in the United Kingdom, which can be considered the one exception amongst frauds where labelling, moral panics and deviancy amplification occurs; explained by some Marxist commentators as a consequence of it being a lower class crime actively pursued by the powerful. 
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Introduction 
Fraud is one of the, if not the most, costly crimes to society in the United Kingdom (and probably many other countries) (National Fraud Authority 2013). Yet the response to it from the Government and from the criminal justice system, bar the exception of benefits fraud, has not matched the magnitude of the problem.  Furthermore, the response from organisations who are victims also does not generally match the size  of the problem, which this paper will illustrate shortly.  Most of the research and scholarship which has touched on this anomaly is rooted in the broader subject of ‘white collar crime’ or its associated derivations of ‘corporate crime’ and ‘crimes of the powerful’ to name some, with limited attention to fraud (Sutherland 1949; Slapper and Tombs 1999; Whyte 2009; Barak 2012; Will et al. 2013; Pontell et al. 2014). Much of this work essentially argues the difference in treatment of so called ‘white collar crimes’ can be explained in the social status of the offenders, their associations and ability to influence the institutions which have a stake in dealing with such crimes, which are ultimately underpinned by assessments of the consequences of the structure of modern capitalism (Levi 1987; Slapper and Tombs 1999; Barak 2012; Will et al. 2013; Pontell et al. 2014). However, the scholarship of the different treatment of white collar offenders has tended to focus upon the most powerful in organisations, rather than the middle managers and those at the bottom. Also very little has been said about the actual processes which lead to the different treatment of so called ‘white collar crimes’. 
This paper will seek to identify some of the processes which lead to this different treatment, using the example of fraud, which is often considered as a ‘white collar crime’. At this point in the paper, it is important to explain  to note the author’s position, specifically, that white collar crime is not always appropriate for exploring fraud as it is a crime committed by every part of society (Cook 1989; Karstedt and Farrall 2006). ‘Lumping’ it together with ‘health and safety’, food offences, environmental crime and others to explain broad issues is ultimately flawed. It would be like trying to generalise about the response to murder and workplace deaths, which are very different problems and have very different responses. The authors believe even generalising about fraud poses problems given the wide diversity of the crime. However, one can unite it as a crime with deception as its principle modus operandi with the aim of producing a gain or causing a loss. It will also look beyond the most powerful who engage in fraud to illustrate and explain that some of the same differential treatments also extend to them too. It will seek to explain why fraud does not solicit the response it deserves. It will do so through the creation of concepts which are the antithesis to labelling, moral panics and deviancy amplification. These are: de-labelling, immoral phlegmatism and deviancy attenuation. It is also likely some of the concepts have utility for other social problems, particularly other white collar crimes and  offences such as sex crimes (rape, child abuse, grooming), domestic violence and hate crime (Coffey, 2014). This is, however, beyond the remit of this paper. Before we embark upon this, it is first important to illustrate very clearly the evidence to show fraud is one of the most costly crimes to society.  
There are a wide range of measures of crime, but it is rare to actually put a cost upon it. In the United Kingdom the last serious effort was in 2000 when the Home Office published an estimate of the total cost of crime at £59.9 billion (Brand and Price 2000). This included the costs of security, insurance, the criminal justice system, healthcare etc. The total value of property stolen or damaged as a result of crime was £18.6 billion. Fraud and forgery accounted for £10.3 billion of that value and no serious additional costs were added, bar the costs of the criminal justice system at £0.6 billion. Part of this figure – individuals and households – was reassessed a few years later, but produced no significant difference for the individual and households figure and fraud wasn’t even included (Dubourg and Hamed 2005). Thus, even on these figures, fraud was the most expensive crime by value of loss. Since this research, however, the National Fraud Authority has been established and it has published an annual fraud indicator covering the value of fraud losses. The most recent –and what will also be the last - estimates fraud to cost the UK economy £52 billion, which is down from its prior estimate of £73 billion (NFA 2012) but up from £30 billion in its first annual report (NFA 2010). Given most property crimes have been in decline, the 2000 figure of £8.3 billion for the actual losses from all other crimes bar fraud was rounded to £10 billion for inflation, and ignoring the downward trend, would still be a fifth of the total losses from fraud.  Given it is the most costly crime to society one would expect tackling fraud to be a major priority. This paper will show, however, the resources that are dedicated to deal with the problem of fraud do not reflect this, bar the exception of social security fraud, which will be considered throughout this paper to illustrate the differences.  
This paper will now consider the processes which explain the different treatment of most frauds. It will begin by outlining the process of de-labelling, before moving on to consider ‘immoral phlegmatism’. In considering the latter, the paper will show how fraud is not accurately measured and how the resources dedicated towards dealing with it are often not appropriate. Finally the paper draws these concepts together to show the deviancy attenuation process.  
De-labelling Fraud 
Labelling is a well known criminological concept by which certain behaviours and individuals become labelled respectively as crimes and criminals by the wider community and official institutions. This has implications for those who are thus ‘labelled’ in terms of their future behaviours and the resources and the priority society puts in place to deal with them. Labelling is often associated with ‘moral panics’, the concept of deviancy amplification and with social problems such as drug-taking, juvenile delinquency to name some (Tannenbaum 1938; Becker 1963; Wilkins 1964). For most volume crimes definitions are fairly straightforward. There is a definition in statute or the common law of an offence, and offenders who undertake such behaviours are prosecuted against those definitions through the criminal justice system. A simple legalistic view would be the mere fact many of these deviant acts are not dealt with as criminal means they are not (Slapper and Tombs, 1999). However, the reality is that for fraud it is more complex. There are behaviours committed by individuals and organisations which contain the basic foundations of the criminal act of fraud. However, those same acts are treated differently according to the victim and the enforcement body. For example Button (2011) found two public sector organisations in one city dealing with comparable staff frauds. One was prosecuting criminally as well as pursuing other regulatory and civil sanctions; whereas the other, for capability and cultural reasons, was simply terminating their employment. 
In England and Wales a criminal definition of the offence is set out under the Fraud Act 2006 (among many other fraud related offences). However, unlike the other volume criminal offences the use of criminal definitions and the criminal justice system represents the tip of the iceberg. There are many more routes to pursuing sanctions for fraudulent behaviours through a ‘fraud justice network’ involving the civil law, regulatory sanctions and through private mechanisms, which create their own nomenclature, where the word fraud is often removed (Levi 1987; Button et al. 2013). The creation of so many non-criminal alternatives could be linked to the ability of the powerful to influence the response to crimes which may affect them, something which will be returned to in the conclusion.  
There are also a variety of justice and regulatory routes to dealing with fraud which use other labels, and in many private organisations, frauds are labelled as something else because of the embarrassment they cause. Terms such as ‘fiddling’, ‘breach of contract’, ‘misconduct’, ‘failing to follow procedures’, a ‘bad debt’ to name some are frequently used (Ditton 1977; Mars 1983; Anderton and Kiely 1988; Levi and Burrows 2008, p. 304). For some the de-labelling of certain criminal behaviours and the use of alternative justice mechanisms is seen as a positive (Braithwaite 1989). 
The deceptive behaviours which fall under fraud are therefore much more elastic in what they can be defined as. As a consequence behaviours, which prima facie for most, would be considered as the criminal act of fraud, and if resources and commitment were available could be pursued in the criminal justice system, often become defined as something else and dealt with through different structures. Fraud is therefore a crime, which is often not labelled as such for a variety of reasons. It is worth illustrating this point with a number of examples. 
In many fraud cases where the offender has resources there is a preference to pursue them in the civil courts to recover some of the losses. Sometimes there is also a realisation a criminal prosecution is going to be costly and risky because the offender has access to top quality legal support where there are many more opportunities in a criminal case, because of the rules of evidence and disclosure, for quality lawyers to exploit weaknesses in a case to halt proceedings, compared to the  civil route where such rules are not as extensive and operate to the lower standard of proof of the ‘balance of probablities’, rather than ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’ The civil route is also often used to bring the defendant to the negotiating table to secure a settlement before the court case.  Whilst it is also accepted that in certain cases following the civil route, the defendant may also have access to a top of the range legal team, there is less ability because of the rules of evidence and lower standard of proof for the lawyers to exploit, to undermine a case and secure an acquittal for the defendant. Such cases are pursued through the torts of deceit, unjust enrichment and conversion to name some of the most common. They are thus immediately redefined as something other than fraud. Such cases can often involve quite serious misconduct involving substantial sums of money. Consider the case known as ‘Operation Holbein’ in the late noughties in the NHS in the UK. The case centred around an alleged £120 million of fraud by pharmaceutical companies fixing prices. Initially the target of a criminal case brought by the SFO, it collapsed in 2008 after an 8 year investigation. The NHS Counter Fraud Service, however,  then pursued them through civil actions and out of court settlements with cases brought in parallel between 2002 and 2007, with around £46 million paid by five pharmaceutical companies in compensation (cited in Button and Leys 2013).  
Another way frauds often become redefined is through regulatory action. In 2012 the then Financial Services Authority published the decision in relation to a Mr Ravi Sinha a senior executive in a private equity firm. Mr Sinha had in the words of the FSA ‘fraudulently obtained’ just under £1.4 million for ‘himself’ from a company his employing firm had invested in. He did this by issuing invoices, which according the FSA (2012: 2) were: 

… payable to himself, to which Mr Sinha knew that he was not entitled. In order to secure payment of the invoices, Mr Sinha deliberately misled the CEO of Company A by claiming that the payments had been authorised and approved by JCF when in fact no such authorisation or approval had been sought or given. In addition, Mr Sinha dishonestly concealed from JCF the fact that he had received the payments from Company A. 
His punishment from the FSA was a financial penalty just short of £3 million and a prohibition order from working in financial services. There was, however, no criminal prosecution and the British tabloid newspaper the Daily Mirror ran with a front page headline, ‘Call this justice? City banker steals £1.4m... no charge. Shop worker steals £10k... 9 months' jail’ (Daily Mirror 2012).  Indeed for many unfamiliar with the way fraud is dealt with will find the definition of such behaviour as ‘regulatory’, rather than criminal, most unusual. A trawl through the FSA website, nevertheless, reveals hundreds of comparable cases which have avoided the criminal justice system. 
It is not just at the regulatory level such behaviours become redefined as something other than criminal fraud. Many employees who engage in fraud and who are discovered by their employers are not dealt with by the criminal justice system. Frequently frauds are very embarrassing to the victim organisation, so they prefer to keep them private. Sometimes it is not possible to secure evidence for a criminal prosecution or there is no interest from overstretched statutory agencies such as the police and CPS. Frequently staff resign or are sacked for gross misconduct for not following procedures (Button et al forthcoming). 
There are also more ubiquitous examples of this type of behaviour. The submission of false or fabricated insurance claims is very common amongst the general public (Insurance Fraud Bureau 2013). Thousands of these claims are discovered by insurers every year. However in most of these claims the claimant faces nothing more than the repudiation of their claim. Indeed in one example Button et al (2013) secured access to over 30,000 claims which had been largely defined as ‘withdrawn not plausible’.  In another example one of the authors was told by a counter fraud specialist who worked for a credit card company he had been head hunted by another. Upon meeting the prospective employers he secured information on a very low fraud rate, which seemed very impressive. However, when he sought information on the bad debt rates this was very high. He concluded the company was redefining fraud as bad debt and declined the offer.  
Immoral Phlegmatism 
The term ‘moral panic’ is frequently used in criminology and wider circles to describe the response to certain types of deviance, which is a threat to social values, out of proportion to the reality of the problem, culminating in a spiral of over-reaction (Murij 2001). It originated in the classic studies of Cohen (1972) vis-à-vis mods and rockers and Becker (1963) and the use of Marijuana. There have been several other crimes and other problems which have spawned what could be described as moral panics since then.  The concept is not without its critics (see Jewkes 2011), but this paper will argue there is the antithesis and it can be found with most fraud offences, bar the exception of social security or benefits fraud (which will be considered separately later in this paper). We call this ‘Immoral phlegmatism’, which is a social problem which is large, but for which the response to deal with it is disproportionately low and that lack of an appropriate response can be considered as immoral. It is important to stress the immoral aspect because there are social problems which are large for which there is also a disproportionately low response, but for most people this would not be considered immoral. Speeding could also be seen as another example of major problem, over which much more could be done to tackle it, such as more speed cameras and police officers patrolling. However, for most someone getting away with speeding would not be considered as immoral, compared to fraud where someone getting away with defrauding somebody or an organisation would for most (Association of British Insurers 2003; Karstedt and Farrall 2006). 
To develop this immoral aspect further, not tackling fraud with an appropriate level response could be considered immoral for a number of reasons. First, fraud in most cases is stealing money/resources through deception. Second, frauds against organisations ultimately impact upon society, frauds against insurers lead to higher premiums and frauds against the government lead to less public services and/or higher taxes. Third, frauds can have a devastating impact upon wider society, the financial crisis since 2007-8 can be attributed in a large part to sub-prime mortgage fraud in the USA (Pontell et al. 2014). Finally, frauds are more associated with higher status individuals and applying different standards to frauds, compared to other volume crimes usually associated with lower social status persons is unfair. 
It could be argued, as by many writers on white collar crime that one of the reasons for the lower priority given to fraud, is because of business interests seeking to minimise the risk of possible sharp-practice undertaken by themselves, is restricted to state ‘regulatory’ enforcement, rather than ‘criminal’ enforcement (Levi 1987). Such arguments are plausible for crimes and fraud perpetrated by corporate bodies of which there is much evidence (Braithwaite 1989; Tombs and White 2007; Barak 2012). However, corporate bodies are victims of fraud too and lose out substantially in financial losses and the lack of interest of state institutions. There are a number of factors which influence this; the first we shall consider is the measurement of the problem. 
Measuring fraud 
The measurement of most volume crimes is relatively un-contentious. The weaknesses with the recorded crime statistics are well known with the attrition from non-reporting and non-recording well documented (Bottomley and Coleman 1981; Walker 1995; Coleman and Moynihan 1996; Koffman 1996; Maguire 2012). Whereas crime surveys, such as the English and Wales crime survey are seen as the gold standard – although even these have weaknesses.  For instance, the survey excludes adult victims not living in ‘normal households’ (Smith 2006: 8) and that, similar to many government statistical outputs, these data are collected principally to serve the political agenda of ministers (Sutton 2007: 257; Fitzgerald, 2014). One way in which this survey could stem the fraud attenuation rate and offer a more accurate picture of this crime is to collect more data relating to fraudulent scams perpetrated against members of the public. Until this happens, it is not surprising that if fraud is frequently defined as a non-crime that  the recorded crime statistics would capture with even less accuracy the extent of the problem. However, added to this are some further attenuating factors. First of all many victims of fraud do not know they are victims, or elect not to report the incident (Fraud Review Team 2006: 7). Fraud is not like a burglary where there is a scene of crime, evidence of a break in and missing property. Many victims do not know they have been victimised for a very long time (Hoare 2007: 268). For example, many people fall victim to share sale scams. They buy investments which are essentially worthless. Unless the fraudster is caught or they seek to withdraw their investment they will be sitting on what they think is valuable, but in reality they have been defrauded. In organisations invoice frauds occur and until they are discovered lie on the company books as legitimate payments. Second, many fraud victims who know they are victims are reluctant to report it (Button et al. 2014). Third, as with other crimes many frauds which are reported are not recorded. For fraud offences there is also a much higher rate of no-criming at triage stage with a 12.5 percent rate, compared to 3.1 percent for other offences (Home Office 2012). That said, the creation of the national fraud reporting centre Action Fraud, whilst removing localised reporting does appear to be having a positive impact on fraud reporting, there being an 8% increase in reported fraud year ending June 2014 (Office for National Statistics, 2014, p.8). Should this trend continue, it suggests that reported crime data may offer a more accurate picture of the extent of the problem, and may put pressure on government, as there will be a public expectation for them to take action. 
General commentators on crime might then argue, but the crime surveys would then pick up a more accurate measure of the extent of fraud, at least of those willing to volunteer they have been victim? However, for individual victims up until 2011-12 there has been only one question asked in the survey vis-à-vis fraud, which related to fraudulent use of a plastic card in the previous 12 months. Only in 2011-12 have wider questions been utilised in the England Wales Crime Survey which go beyond this in relation to mass marketing fraud. It is a positive step forward that this crime is at last on the agenda of the crime survey, but there are still weaknesses. For example, the survey fails to keep up to date with evolving technological changes that facilitate new opportunities for fraud it also did not offer a confidential survey as is done for domestic violence, which given potential embarrassment may have hindered honest answers by participants (Mann and Sutton 1998: 225; Hoare 2007: 267). 
There is also evidence from some studies and other countries which have been more pro-active in seeking to gauge individual victimisation of the significant extent of the problem. Karstedt and Farrall (2006) in England and Wales, Germany and Eastern Germany found 80 percent of those surveyed had been victims of ‘crimes of everyday life’ at some time, most of which could be considered frauds in their broader sense. Growing sophistication in prevalence surveys of crime conducted on a regular basis has emerged in several industrial nations. Unfortunately their coverage of fraud is generally weak to non-existent. Some countries have also commissioned one off pieces of research. The evidence shows very large numbers of people in the countries concerned who have fallen victims to frauds. In Australia 6.7 percent of the population over 15 had been the victim of a personal fraud in the previous 12 months (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012). In the UK in 2006, 48 percent admitted having been targeted with a scam and 8 percent had been victims (Office of Fair Trading 2006). Research commissioned for the National Fraud Authority’s Annual Fraud Indicator in 2012 found 8.8 percent of those surveyed had been victims of identity fraud in previous 12 months (National Fraud Authority 2013). In the USA in 2005 13.5 percent of adults were victims of a consumer fraud, in 2010 24 percent of US households had one person who was the victim of fraud related crime and at least 7 percent of households having at least one householder the victims of identity fraud (Federal Trade Commission 2007a and b; Huff et al. 2010; US Department of Justice 2011).
The other major problem with crime surveys is that they do not cover organisations (Blunt and Hand 2007: 7).  In England and Wales the Home Office commercial victimisation survey has sought to partly fill this gap. However, it only covers a few sectors and prior to the 2012 study the last undertaken was in 2002 (Shury, Speed, Vivian, Kuechel and Nicholas 2005). The 2012 survey found that 5 percent of manufacturing, 13 percent of wholesale and retail, 7 percent of transportation and storage and 10 percent of accommodation and food premises had experienced a fraud in the past 12 months (Home Office 2013). To this must be added the National Fraud Authority’s Annual Fraud Indicator which uses a basket of measures to estimate the costs of fraud to UK plc. The methodology has changed each year, so comparison is difficult. However, the findings from the latest indicator show a £52 billion problem. It is also interesting to note that this will be the last fraud indicator as the NFA is to be abolished and this indicator is one the functions which has not been re-distributed. This provides further evidence of the lack of interest in measuring the true scale of the problem from one of the most important quarters, the Government. 
In organisations too there is evidence that fraud is a much bigger problem than many consider when appropriate measures are undertaken. To really find out what the extent of fraud is within an organisation a fraud loss measurement (FLM) exercise needs to be conducted. FLM is an assessment of a statistically valid sample of transactions within a given population to determine whether they are fraudulent, an error or correct (clear standards are set to define fraud and error and this usually involves the civil definition of fraud). It is important to also note the thorough investigations which usually take place along with FLM on the sample transactions, called Payment Recapture Audits, which often involve (cited in Hatch and McMurtry 2010: 19): 
investigations in which specialized private sector auditors use cutting-edge technology and tools to scrutinize government payments and then find and reclaim taxpayer funds made in error or gained through fraud (emphasis added).

These investigations go beyond a normal assessment and there is also an expectation to recover losses from the payments made in fraud and error. They are therefore more than an academic exercise to gauge the size of the problem. From this assessment it is then possible to accurately estimate to a given statistical level of confidence and tolerance range the true extent of fraud and error. This is usually presented as a Fraud Frequency Rate (FFR), which is the number of transactions which are fraudulent or errors and the Fraud Loss Rate (FLR), which is monetary value of losses (Brooks, Button and Gee 2012; Button, Gee and Brooks 2012; Gee, Button and Bassett 2011). In the USA fraud and error are combined under ‘improper payments’. FLM has largely been used in large public sector organisations relating to social security payments, taxation, contractor payments and for procurement and insurance frauds in the private sector. Indeed in the USA some Federal bodies  are required to undertake such measurement under the Improper Payments Information Act 2002 and the Improper Payment Elimination and Recovery Act 2012 (Hatch and McMurtry 2010; Tunley 2011a). Of those FLM exercises in the public domain, or which came to the attention of Gee et al (2011) 203 exercises have been identified producing an average fraud and error loss of 5.67%.  






Table 1: How does your organisation measure fraud?

	Public	Private	VC	Totals (n=)	%
Received incidents of fraud(detected) by number of cases	51	42	11	104	34
Received incidents of fraud(detected) by total monetary value of losses	45	44	7	96	31
Fraud loss measurement exercise by number of suspected cases	21	21	5	47	15




Tunley (2014) also uncovered some interesting reasons why organisations did not measure fraud also proved illuminating for the concept of immoral phlegmatism: 
“Senior management and/or elected members are ambivalent towards fraud and corruption.”
“no interest!”
“Other priorities are considered more important”
“the focus tends to be on measuring fraud in organisations we regulate rather than our own.”
“no fraud in the organisation”
“Although the organization undertakes fraud work for other organizations there is little concern that fraud may be occurring within.”
“because we are a religious charity there is no fraud.” 
“given the nature of my organisation, significant fraud is unlikely. Low level fraud is inevitable but we can live with it.”
“Is seen as a low priority because the level of fraud is perceived to be low and it is so difficult to gain an accurate measurement.”
Given there is evidence to suggest fraud levels in many areas can be around 5 percent the lack of interest in most organisations in estimating the size of the problem can be seen as another illustration of immoral phlegmatism (ACFE 2012; Button et al. 2012). 
Approach and resources dedicated to fraud
The next aspect of attenuation is the resources given to counter fraud. One can see if it has already been de-labelled as crime and measures are in place which don’t capture the true size of the problem, therefore resources are not going to be of an appropriate size. The limited and declining resources of the police can be used to illustrate this. During the mid 1980s it was estimated there were about 600 fraud squad officers (Levi 1986). The 2006 Fraud Review identified 416 police officers in fraud squads throughout the country (Fraud Review Team 2006). More recent research has suggested this has declined further (Gannon and Doig 2010). This decline must also be set against a period of substantial increase in police numbers generally, further illustrating the disinterest of the police in fraud (Berman 2012). Given most police forces since 2010 have been experiencing substantial cuts in resources in the current climate (20%), that economic crime departments are not protected and are generally of low priority, it would be reasonable to assume that the 416 officers have declined further. 
The Fraud Review Team (2006) uncovered lots of examples on the inability of the police to deal with fraud. The ABI submission to the 2006 Fraud Review highlighted significant police disinterest in major organised crash-for-cash fraud. One case illustrated in the submission involved 400+ staged accidents involving organised criminals, who were using the money to fund drug-trafficking, prostitution and gun running. The police would only investigate if the insurers funded it. As a result this case did not go any further (Association of British Insurers n.d. cited in The Fraud Review Team 2006).  Other cases like this were also cited. Indeed one of the conclusions in this submission was: 
Most police forces do not have the resources to deal with fraud effectively. There is a shortage of experienced fraud officers, and those few with the right experience are frequently transferred to other duties. Even where dedicated financial crime units exist, their main role is to support other officers on technical issues (such as tracing money and asset recovery) arising from more “conventional” crimes (p 5).
One of the most damning discoveries was a letter from a Chief Constable to a bank concerning a £100,000 employee fraud (The Fraud Review Team 2006: 69):
The investigation of fraud is extremely expensive in terms of hours spent obtaining statements and preparing a prosecution case. The Constabulary is required under the Crime and Disorder Act to produce a crime reduction strategy. Our strategy identifies priority areas and police resources are directed to those priority areas. Fraud is not one of them. 
It is worth illustrating the lack of resources dedicated to fraud in general by comparing general fraud to benefits fraud. Several academics have noted the different way social security fraud is dealt with compared to other offences (Cook 1989; Cook 1997; Dean and Melrose 1997). Politicians, the media and the public get worked up over social security fraud (Golding and Middleton 1982; Golding 1999; Connor 2007; Grover 2005; Tunley 2011b). It is the one type of fraud for which there is widespread disapproval with aspirations and initiatives to do something about it.















Figure 1. The Cost of Benefits Fraud In The UK In Comparison to Others


Adapted from National Fraud Authority (2013)
Media interest 
The media and sensational reporting are central to moral panics and for benefits fraud this is very important to the hype. The media regularly focus on benefit cheats with ‘luxurious lifestyles’ funded by defrauding the system (Golding and Middleton 1982; Golding 1999). The tabloid newspaper The Sun has been very pro-active in reporting this problem. In May 2013 in launched a campaign to ‘beat the cheats’ encouraging readers to contact them with suspected benefit cheats. Their campaign has yielded many spectacular cases which have been published in the papers in great detail including a woman working as a pole dancer while claiming incapacity benefit for depression, a man claiming disability allowance while riding speedway motorbikes and another running a window-cleaning business while claiming benefits related to an inability to go outside, to name some of the more spectacular.  It is not just the Sun which campaigns on this issue, all the other tabloid press cover these issues as do the ‘quality’ media outlets too, in part. BBC News, for example, regularly covers social security fraud cases and the topic of benefit fraud also receives regular coverage on television, such as ‘Saints and Scroungers’ (Gordon 2013). This can be contrasted to general fraud where there is much less media interest. Frauds do get reported in the media, but they tend to focus upon staff frauds with some additional salacious factor, such as the money was used for gambling, prostitutes etc or someone famous is linked to the story. This should be contrasted with the specialist media which Levi (2006) has noted does tend to cover fraud, but in a different way.  

Discussion and Conclusion 
The model below in Figure 2 revisits deviancy attenuation to illustrate the discussion so far. If we commence at ’1 o’clock’, the process begins with the narrowing of behaviours defined as the crime of fraud, added to that is limited measurement, which leads to statistics showing fraud is not a major problem, which leads to a lower priority and resources dedicated to the problem, which means detections and sanctions are lower, which then reinforces to decision-makers fraud is not a problem. The exception to this benefits/social security fraud, which as the complete opposite, further illustrates deviancy attention and immoral phlegmatism for general frauds.  




The process is underpinned by an immoral phlegmatism amongst the key decision-makers in Government, law enforcement and organisations which attenuates the problem. The limited interest which has examined white collar crimes and why they are treated differently has focused upon the links of the powerful. As Pontell et al (2014: 7) note with regard to the lack of criminal prosecutions relating to the fraud which caused the 2008 financial crash, ‘Those holding political power are generally reluctant to define the acts of close associates and beneficiaries as deviant or criminal.’ They also note that many of those in political power came from such positions previously or are likely to be heading to them when leaving office. Such class based explanations are plausible for the frauds which are committed by senior managers on their own corporations or by corporations. Indeed the processes that have been set out in this paper can be seen as the means by which some in positions of power operate to attenuate the problem. They do not, however, account for many other types of fraud committed by middle managers, low level employees and the public. Setting aside social security fraud the response to many of these frauds – although more concerted for those at the very top – is still not commensurate to the size and nature of the problem. It is here where the processes outlined in the paper and the under-pinning phlegmatism combine to attenuate. It is also perhaps also worth noting that ultimately most fraud (bar benefits fraud) has a much more ambiguous position compared to other volume crimes and this permeates all sections of society. Individuals exaggerating an insurance claim, under-declaring on a tax return, not paying VAT by paying cash, exaggerating travel expenses, miss-representing information for a job or a mortgage application or banks selling products which are in reality useless or organisations submitting false information to regulators; are just some of the many fraudulent behaviours which regularly occur and which significant numbers regard their seriousness as a criminal act ambiguously. Thus while the connections and attitudes of the most powerful are important for influencing the attenuating processes for some frauds, it must not be forgotten that there are also attitudes and beliefs more widespread in the population which influence the attenuating processes.   
This paper has introduced the process of de-labelling, which leads to frauds to not only being defined as something not criminal, but also called other names. The paper has also shown that there is an immoral phlegmatism dominant amongst those in positions of power at a national and organisational level. It has shown that fraud is not accurately measured and that the resources dedicated to dealing with it are not commensurate with the size of the problem. There is also less media interest in most frauds, particularly when compared to benefits fraud. All of these processes combine to attenuate the problem of fraud, leading to circle of attenuation. 
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